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Abstract: 
This paper is a review of Danmarks Nationalbank's recent analysis of the pro-
spects of implementing a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) in Denmark. 
We concur with Nationalbanken's conclusion that CBDC does not add efficiency 
or further functionality to existing payment solutions. We argue, however, that 
their analysis fails to take into account the potentials for increased financial sta-
bility given the fact that CBDC carries no credit risk. We also find that Na-
tionalbanken's dismissal of CBDC on the grounds that it does not provide new 
monetary policy tools, since interest rates are bound by the fixed exchange rate 
regime, fails to consider the value of CBDC in the event of a future crisis. Final-
ly, we argue that the Nationalbanken's views may reflect a primary concern with 
the preservation of the existing banking sector in its current form over and above 
the needs of the general public. 
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Introduction 
A hot topic in contemporary central banking is the idea of Central Bank Digital 
Currency (CBDC). This is the idea that central banks should offer a public al-
ternative to, or even a substitution for, commercial bank deposit money, which is 
currently the only form of digital money denominated in national currencies 
available to ordinary money users. CBDC would be implemented by opening the 
balance sheet of the central banks to private individuals and non-financial com-
panies thus allowing them to hold an account directly with the central bank. 
This idea is being researched and debated internationally by central banks and 
other stakeholders.1 
Danmarks Nationalbank has entered into the debate with the recent publica-
tion of their analysis 'Central bank digital currency in Denmark?'.2 The publica-
tion stands out in the debate by being the most conclusive opinion voiced by any 
central bank so far. Danmarks Nationalbank seems to be the first central bank to 
have made up their mind on the question of CBDC. The publications and 
speeches made by other central banks at the moment are much more hesitant, 
                                         
 
 
1 John Barrdear and Michael Kumhof, ‘The Macroeconomics of Central Bank Issued 
Digital Currencies’, Staff Working Paper (Bank of England, 2016); Morten Linnemann 
Bech and Rodney Garratt, ‘Central Bank Cryptocurrencies’, BIS Quarterly Review, 
2017; Ole Bjerg, ‘Designing New Money: The Policy Trilemma of Central Bank Digi-
tal Currency’, CBS Working Paper (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School, 2017); 
Michael D. Bordo and Andrew T. Levin, ‘Central Bank Digital Currency and the Fu-
ture of Monetary Policy’, Working Paper (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
August 2017); Ben Broadbent, ‘Central Banks and Digital Currencies’, Speech at 
London School of Economics (Bank of England, 2016); Ben Dyson and Graeme Hodg-
son, ‘Digital Cash: Why Central Banks Should Issue Digital Currency’ (London: Posi-
tive Money, 2016); Walter Engert and Ben Fung, ‘Central Bank Digital Currency: 
Motivations and Implications’, Discussion Paper (Bank of Canada, 2017); Salomon 
Fiedler et al., ‘Financial Innovation and Monetary Policy: Challenges and Prospects’, 
Monetary Dialogue - In-Depth-Analysis (European Parliament, 2017); Juan Antonio 
Ketterer et al., ‘Digital Central Bank Money and the Unbundling of the Banking 
Function’, Discussion Paper (Inter-American Development Bank, 2016); Cecilia 
Skingsley, ‘Should the Riksbank Issue E-Krona?’, Speech by the Deputy Governor, 
FinTech Stockholm (Stockholm: Sveriges Riksbank, 2016). 
2 Kirsten Gürtler et al., ‘Central Bank Digital Currency in Denmark?’, Analysis (Dan-
marks Nationalbank, 2017). 
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questioning and explorative as they call for more research and debate on the sub-
ject.3 
The argument of Nationalbanken's analysis is rather unambiguous as it 
amounts to a clear dismissal of any plans to implement CBDC. The sentiment of 
the paper is perhaps best expressed by a speech made by Governor Hugo Frey 
Jensen a few weeks prior the publication of the analysis. The title of the speech 
sums up the conclusion: 'Central Banks and Digital Currencies - A solution with-
out problems?'4 Danmarks Nationalbank does not hesitate to conclude that the 
idea of central banks creating digital money is irrelevant to a country like Den-
mark because the existing payment system provided by private commercial banks 
does not present any problems that would be solved by a public alternative: 'In a 
Danish context, it is unclear what central bank digital currency would be able to 
contribute that is not already covered by the current payment solutions.'5 
The specifics of the argument behind Nationalbanken's dismissal of CBDC are 
explored in the following. 
 
What is the problem? 
Should central banks issue digital currency to households and busi-
nesses, as a supplement to physical cash and deposits with commer-
cial banks?6 
The purpose of the current paper is to review the analysis and arguments pre-
sented by Danmarks Nationalbank on the topic of CBDC. But before we dive 
into the pros and cons, it is worth dwelling on the framing of the problem at 
hand. The above passage constitutes the very beginning of the main text of the 
paper and it is how Nationalbanken formulates the question of their inquiry. 
While this is indeed a clear and concise formulation of the problem, we should 
also be careful to not let ourselves be absorbed by the seemingly technical nature 
of this question. On the one hand, the introduction of CBDC is merely an ad-
                                         
 
 
3 Stefan Ingves, ‘Do We Need an E-Krona?’, Speech by Governor (Sveriges Riksbank, 
2017); Jon Nicolaisen, ‘What Should the Future Form of Our Money Be?’, Speech by 
Deputy Governor Jon Nicolaisen at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters 
(Norges Bank, 2017). 
4 Hugo Frey Jensen, ‘Central Banks and Digital Currencies - A Solution without Prob-
lems?’, Speech by Governor (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2017). 
5 Gürtler et al., ‘Central Bank Digital Currency in Denmark?’, 1. 
6 Gürtler et al., 1. 
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justment to the existing payment infrastructure. On the other hand, CBDC con-
stitutes nothing short of an entirely new form of money. 
In contrast to Danmarks Nationalbank, which seems to treat the question of 
CBDC as largely just a technocratic matter, the Swedish Riksbank uses the ques-
tion as an opportunity to investigate, debate and reflect upon the role of central 
banks in contemporary society. In a speech titled 'Do we need and e-krona?' the 
governor of Riksbanken says: 'The question ... touches on almost philosophical 
musings as to why the need for central banks arose once upon a time.' And he 
proceeds to speculate: 'What is money, and what is required for money to func-
tion as such? What is the difference between various types of money? Why have 
central banks gained such a central role in the monetary system?'7    
The original founding of central banks such as Svenska Riksbanken, the Bank 
of England, and also Danmarks Nationalbank was intimately connected with the 
emergence and proliferation of a new kind of money, which was paper money.8 
Contrary to earlier forms of money, the issuance of paper money is not materially 
constrained by the availability of precious metals. Therefore central banks were 
given the mandate to administer a monopoly on the issuance of this new kind of 
money thus imposing a legal constraint on the supply of money. 
In this light, the question of CBDC has much more profound implications 
than what is immediately suggested by the question posed by Danmarks Na-
tionalbank. The greatest monetary innovation since the introduction of paper 
money and the original founding of central banks is the emergence and prolifera-
tion of digital money. Just as paper money gradually diminished the role of pre-
cious metal coins as circulating currency, so has digital money replaced paper 
money as the dominant form of money. But the difference between paper money 
and digital money is not only one of convenience, functionality and material con-
stitution. While the issuance of paper money is still subject to central bank mo-
nopoly, digital money is created by private commercial banks.9 This means that 
as notes and coins are being phased out the central bank is losing the capacity to 
create money, which can be held by the general public.  
Even though this pivotal shift in the way that money is created has had tre-
mendous consequences for our financial systems as well as our economies in gen-
                                         
 
 
7 Ingves, ‘Do We Need an E-Krona?’, 1, 3. 
8 Ole Bjerg, Vores Penge i Vores Bank (Informations Forlag, 2017). 
9 Michael McLeay, Amar Radia, and Ryland Thomas, ‘Money Creation in the Modern 
Economy’, Quarterly Bulletin 54, no. 1 (2014): 14–27. 
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eral, it was never brought about by a deliberate political and democratic deci-
sion. In Denmark and Sweden, for instance, we have had referendums on whether 
we wanted to substitute our national currencies for the Euro or not. But neither 
Denmark, Sweden nor any other country has ever had a referendum on whether 
the people wanted commercial banks rather than central banks to create the 
money that we depend upon for our daily shopping, receiving salary, paying tax-
es, paying bills, paying debts, etc. Nor have we seen public disputes between ma-
jor political parties on this question. Money creation is rarely if ever an issue in 
parliamentary elections. 
We should not underestimate the importance of the emergence of the question 
of CBDC on central bank agendas around the world. Beyond, or perhaps rather 
behind, the seemingly technical nature of the question is the opportunity for 
opening public debates around a series of more political and even constitutional 
questions about money. These are questions such as: Who should create the 
money in our economy? What is the role and responsibility of central banks to-
day? Should the central bank monopoly on paper money be extended to digital 
money? Danmarks Nationalbank's analysis of CBDC and its conclusion on the 
issue should be read in light of these more fundamental questions. The purpose of 
our review of this analysis is thus not only to evaluate the arguments for and 
against CBDC but also to put the argument into a broader political and consti-
tutional context. As we shall see, the analysis is also informative in terms of the 
way that Danmarks Nationalbank thinks of itself and its role in society. 
The responsibility of Danmarks Nationalbank as well as comparable central 
banks is divided into three policy objectives: payment system provision, financial 
stability and monetary stability. The three policy objectives roughly correspond 
to the three conventional functions of money: 1) Payment systems provision is 
about making sure that money functions as a convenient and efficient medium of 
exchange. 2) Financial stability amounts to maintaining money as a stable store 
of value. And 3) monetary stability amounts to maintaining the currency as a 
stable unit of account. 
The three functions of the central bank are applied in Danmarks National-
bank's analysis as the background against which the pros and cons of CBDC are 
evaluated: 'the effect of central bank digital currency on Danmarks National-
bank’s core tasks with regards to payment systems, financial stability and mone-
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tary policy is examined.'10 In the first part of our review, we shall be replicating 
this structure and thus begin with payment system provision. 
 
Payment System Provision 
The payment system is the user interface of the monetary system. It includes the 
notes and coins, which we use for cash payments, as well as the various digital 
payment systems used in the transfer of bank deposit money. Here is how Dan-
marks Nationalbank presents the system: 
Denmark has a modern and well-functioning payments market. Be-
sides cash, there are a number of electronic payment solutions offered 
by private operators. The solutions include the Dankort (national 
debit card), international credit and debit cards, and the MobilePay 
mobile payment solution that makes it possible to use a smartphone 
to transfer money electronically to both persons and retailers.11 
While Danmarks Nationalbank is responsible for the functioning of the pay-
ment system, the actual provision is largely undertaken by various private opera-
tors. Some services such as the issuance of cash or the performance of some forms 
of interbank clearing are executed directly by the central bank. With respect to 
other services such as the creation of bank deposit money, the distribution of 
cash or the execution of payments in digital money, the central bank merely acts 
as a facilitator for private companies. Danmarks Nationalbank thus exercises its 
responsibility for payment system provision largely by making sure that there is 
an efficient market in which private agents may compete: 
On the one hand, many users of the same [payment] solution is a 
benefit for society, yet on the other hand, if the lack of competition 
means that a payment service provider can set artificially high prices, 
this could lead to monopoly-like conditions in the market. It is there-
fore important that the relevant authorities continuously monitor the 
terms of competition and intervene if a market failure is observed. 
But if the market is well-functioning, society will benefit from private 
agents competing for customers. This will also encourage innova-
tion.12 
                                         
 
 
10 Gürtler et al., ‘Central Bank Digital Currency in Denmark?’, 2. 
11 Gürtler et al., 6. 
12 Gürtler et al., 10–11. 
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The Act on Payments adopted by the Danish Parliament and entered into 
force in 2018 is intended to improve the efficiency of this market.13 The Act sepa-
rates two functions in the provision of payments: 1) The management of ac-
counts, where money users store their money. This function is by definition per-
formed by banks, since the money stored consists in bank deposits. 2) The initia-
tion of payments, which is the user interface that allows money users to transfer 
money between accounts. This function has traditionally also been performed by 
banks through personal service, online-banking services, mobile apps, etc. The 
Act on Payments, however, obliges banks as account managers to allow third-
party providers to initiate payments on behalf of account holders thus making it 
possible for non-banks such as Apple or Facebook to provide payment applica-
tions without holding money user accounts. 
There are different ways to implement CBDC but it seems likely that the role 
performed by the central bank in such a system is that of an account manager 
rather than a payment solution provider. In similar fashion as banks are now 
obliged to do with the Act on Payments, Danmarks Nationalbank would provide 
third party access to the CBDC accounts of money users, which means that they 
would be accessible by means of a Dankort, a form of MobilePay, ApplePay or 
some other application. 
In terms of efficiency, functionality, convenience, reliability and security, the 
implementation of CBDC would thus not constitute any significant change for 
the experience of the individual money user. Danmarks Nationalbank would be 
nothing but an alternative account manager in addition to the existing deposit 
banks, where money users may choose to store some of their money. From the 
narrow perspective of payment system provision, there is thus little reason to 
disagree with the conclusion of the analysis of Danmarks Nationalbank: 
It is difficult to see what central bank digital currency would be able 
to contribute that is not already covered by the payment solutions 
which exist today. Denmark has a secure and effective payments in-
frastructure and digital currency, in the form of bank deposits, al-
ready exists.14 
At the same time, this quote also captures the main problem of the analysis. 
CBDC is not first and foremost a payment solution and the most important ar-
                                         
 
 
13 Gürtler et al., 10. 
14 Gürtler et al., 1. 
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guments for its implementation are not that it would constitute an improvement 
in terms of payment system provision. Therefore, we should also not dismiss it on 
the grounds that it does not improve the efficiency or the security of the pay-
ment system. The significant changes implied by CBDC are within the domains 
of financial stability and monetary policy. We shall now turn to these issues. 
 
Financial Stability 
Financial stability is first and foremost related to the functioning of money as a 
store of value. Central bank responsibility for financial stability may be summa-
rized as the maintenance of parity between the different kinds of money circulat-
ing as kroner. This implies that the value of bank deposit money circulates at par 
with cash. Money users should be able to purchase the same amount of goods for 
100 kroner in bank deposit money as for 100 kroner in cash and they should be 
able to exchange 100 kroner in bank money for 100 kroner in cash. 
The challenge in maintaining financial stability and parity is that cash and 
bank deposit money are quite different forms of money. There is the obvious dif-
ference that the former is tangible while the latter is intangible. But more im-
portantly cash is issued by the central bank and thus subject to laws governing 
the state monopoly on money creation. In contrast, deposit money is created as 
banks expand their balances typically in the process of lending. This means that 
the state is responsible for the relative value of cash and bank deposit money, 
while the creation of the latter is left to private agents. 
As illustrated in chart 2 in Danmarks Nationalbank's analysis, cash is a claim 
on the central bank and bank deposits are a claim on commercial banks. By defi-
nition cash carries no credit risk. Even if the central bank were to become insol-
vent, cash would maintain its value as it is by law defined as legal tender. Sellers 
of goods and services are obliged by law to accept cash as payment at the nomi-
nal value. The same applies to creditors, who are also obliged by law to accept 
cash at the nominal value in the settlement of debts. Finally, the government 
should also be prepared to accept cash in the payment of taxes and other debts 
to the state even though it may be difficult to find a government office that is 
actually able to receive the money. 
Even though bank deposit money is today much more convenient than cash 
and it can readily be used for all kinds of payments and debt settlements, it does, 
nevertheless, carry a credit risk. If a private bank becomes insolvent or even just 
illiquid it may not be able to raise the funds required to settle balances with 
counter parties and clear payments. This means that customers cannot use the 
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money in their deposit accounts nor can they exchange them for cash. They will 
have lost their money. 
In sum, money users today have a choice between two kinds of money for 
storing value. They can hold cash, which is inconvenient but risk-free. Or they 
can hold bank deposit money, which is convenient but carries a credit risk. The 
key feature of CBDC is that it takes the best of both of these kinds of money and 
combines them. CBDC is both convenient and risk-free. For a public institution 
devoted to providing the best possible service to the population, the implementa-
tion of such kind of super money should be an obvious choice. This is, however, 
not the way that Danmarks Nationalbank views the matter. Here is a key formu-
lation in their analysis: 
The fact that CBDC is a claim on Danmarks Nationalbank means 
that, like cash, it is risk-free. However, the Danish depositor guaran-
tee scheme entails that deposits with commercial banks of up to euro 
100,000, or around kr. 750,000, are covered by the Guarantee Fund. 
The Guarantee Fund, previously the Depositor Guarantee Fund, is 
the Danish Depositor and Investor Guarantee Scheme. Its purpose is 
to cover depositors and investors if a Danish bank fails. The Guaran-
tee Fund’s target level is 0.8 per cent of the deposits covered. If this 
amount is not sufficient to fulfill the Guarantee Fund’s obligations, it 
can raise a state-guaranteed loan.  Net deposits exceeding kr. 750,000 
are not covered by the Guarantee Fund, and depositors with larger 
deposits may therefore risk losses.15 
In order to unlock the logic of this argument, we need to invoke the distinc-
tion between de jure and de facto. As we have explained in the above cash is de 
jure risk-free. By definition it carries no credit risk by virtue of being a claim on 
the central bank. Now it is true, as explained in the quote, that there are differ-
ent schemes put in place in order to guarantee the value of bank deposit money 
and to make it circulate as de facto risk-free. The first line of defense is the 
Guarantee Fund, which is a form of mutual insurance provided by the banking 
sector itself. While this fund may be able to taper over problems in an individual 
small or medium-sized bank, it is grossly insufficient to handle a larger systemic 
crisis. Such crisis would invoke the second line of defense, the 'state-guaranteed 
loan', which is the technical term for government bail-out. 
                                         
 
 
15 Gürtler et al., 2–3. 
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Under normal circumstances there is no difference between de jure and de fac-
to. Since everyone relies on the government eventually stepping in to secure the 
value of bank deposit money in the case of a crisis, we can all afford to treat this 
money as if it were risk-free. But the definition of a crisis is exactly the end of 
'normal circumstances' and the occurrence of the unexpected. The credit risk in 
bank deposit money has not been eliminated by deposit insurance and state 
guaranteed loans. It has merely been displaced or suppressed. A crisis may cause 
it to reappear in an unexpected place. 
First, if the government bails out the banks in a new systemic crisis, money 
users are still going to pay for it. Only this time they will be paying in their ca-
pacity as tax payers rather than depositors. Secondly, money users may find that 
in the event of a systemic crisis the government changes its mind and retracts its 
guarantee. It may, for instance, decide to make depositors bail-in the banks ra-
ther than offer a bail-out. 
A government backed depositor guarantee is like a gold standard. A gold 
standard makes money circulate as if it is gold. But the nature of a gold stand-
ard is that it is there until one day it isn't. And curiously, this day is often exact-
ly the day when money users want to use the gold standard. Similarly, depositor 
guarantee also makes bank money circulate as if it is risk-free, until one day the 
guarantee may not be there anymore. Depositor guarantees as well as gold stand-
ards tend to work best, when we don't need them, and not work very well, when 
we really need them. 
Another way of thinking about the maintenance of parity between cash and 
bank money is through the notion of the bank run. Bank runs happen, when 
money users doubt the value of bank money and thus 'run' to the bank in order 
to convert their deposits into cash. Providing money users with the opportunity 
to hold risk-free CBDC means that they no longer have to go down to the bank 
to make a bank run: 
One of the greatest risks to financial stability from introducing 
CBDC is the increased risk of systemic bank runs. /.../ With CBDC, 
households and businesses would have an incentive to transfer their 
bank deposits to CBDC in a systemic crisis situation, unless there 
were a ceiling on the outstanding amount of CBDC. In step with de-
clining confidence in the banking sector, this might happen, despite 
the depositor guarantee scheme and any higher interest rate on bank 
deposits. Today, deposits can in principle be converted to cash, but 
the practical challenges concerning cash make this less attractive. 
Furthermore, the general conversion of bank deposits to cash would 
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take time, whereas conversion to CBDC could take place immediate-
ly. CBDC might therefore increase the risk of bank runs.16 
On the one hand, it makes perfect sense for the central bank to do whatever it 
takes to prevent bank runs as such events create massive financial instability. On 
the other hand, a bank run is nothing but the response of the free market in a 
situation of financial instability. In a situation of 'declining confidence in the 
banking sector' money users are simply factoring credit risk into the pricing of 
different kinds of money. As cash and bank money carry different credit risks, 
they are priced differently in the market, and parity breaks down. 
If Danmarks Nationalbank were to implement CBDC, it would provide money 
users with a convenient way of acting on the real market price of different kinds 
of money. This would improve the natural mechanisms of price discovery in the 
money market. It would also create more market pressure on the banking sector 
to make sure that they are financially robust because money users would have a 
competitive alternative to bank money. As we can see from the quote above, the 
reasoning of Danmarks Nationalbank is the complete opposite. Rather than 
providing money users with a risk-free digital alternative to bank money, the 
solution is to force money users to absorb the risk of the banking system by not 
giving them any other choice than using the liabilities of private companies as 
money. 
Danmarks Nationalbank is confusing cause and effect. Bank runs are not the 
cause of financial instability but rather the effect of the market reacting to prob-
lems in the banking sector. Therefore you cannot solve problems of financial in-
stability by simply preventing bank runs. This backwards logic is similar to the 
former DDR, where the government thought they could solve the problems of the 
country by simply preventing people from escaping to the West. If a bank cannot 
persuade money users to hold bank deposit money by running their business in a 
way that minimizes credit risk or at least by offering interest rates corresponding 
to any credit risk, it should probably not be in business in the first place. 
With respect to financial stability and CBDC Danmarks Nationalbank con-
cludes: 
It is not part of Danmarks Nationalbank’s objectives to make unlim-
ited claims on the central bank available to the general public, but 
                                         
 
 
16 Gürtler et al., 16. 
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instead to support stable prices, financial stability and secure pay-
ments, cf. above.17 
What Danmarks Nationalbank seems to be supporting, first of all, by depriv-
ing money users of the opportunity to hold risk-free CBDC is the business model 
of the existing banking sector. The first official announcement by the Royal Gov-
ernor of Nationalbanken, Lars Rohde, on CBDC was made at the annual meeting 
of the Danish financial industry association, Finans Danmark, in December 2017. 
In his speech, Rohde dismissed the idea of a central bank issued e-krone with the 
following words to the bankers: 'So I can set your minds at ease: Danmarks Na-
tionalbank has no plans to compete directly with the banks.'18 In other words, 
the privilege to create digital money in Denmark shall remain exclusively in the 
hands of commercial banks. 
If Danmarks Nationalbank believes that the creation of CBDC is an illegiti-
mate form of state competition with private banks, we might ask why they main-
tain their monopoly on the issuance of physical money. Isn't this also a form of 
competition with private banks, which could also potentially issue our notes and 
coins? Conversely, we might also ask why Nationalbanken voices forceful warn-
ings and critique against Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies?19 Should private 
banks also be protected from competition from other agents in the financial in-
dustry? 
 
Monetary Policy 
The third issue in the evaluation, monetary policy, is concerned with price stabil-
ity. This implies the maintenance of the krone as a stable unit of account for the 
pricing of goods and services in the Danish economy. Price stability is commonly 
defined as a stable inflation rate of approximately 2% measured by the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). Before we get to the actual discussion of CBDC, we need to 
look at the current situation of monetary policy because this is the benchmark 
against which the implementation of CBDC is evaluated. 
                                         
 
 
17 Gürtler et al., 13. 
18 Lars Rohde, ‘Speech by Governor Lars Rohde at the Annual Meeting of Finance 
Denmark 2017’ (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2017). 
19 Casper Schrøder, ‘Nationalbanken sammenligner bitcoin med tulipan-krakket i 1600-
tallet’, DR.dk, 2017. 
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The following quote from the analysis is very informative, because it demon-
strates how the fixed exchange rate against the euro is so ingrained in the mone-
tary policy of Danmarks Nationalbank that it is more or less conflated with price 
stability: 
By maintaining a fixed exchange rate against the euro, Danmarks 
Nationalbank ensures stable price development in Danish kroner 
terms. This means that the amount of goods and services that can be 
purchased for kr. 100, for example, does not fluctuate much from year 
to year. In other words, money issued by Danmarks Nationalbank 
maintains its real value. The same applies to bank deposits, since 
they are also denominated in kroner.20 
While price stability is measured as the value of krone denominated money 
relative to goods and services, the fixed exchange rate policy is concerned with 
the value of krone denominated money relative to euro denominated money. 
Price stability and currency pegging are thus two very different things. The peg-
ging of the krone to the euro is not a statutory mandate of Danmarks National-
bank. It is thus not an end in itself but rather a means adopted by Danmarks 
Nationalbank to achieve the goal of price stability.  
The key tool in the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate against the euro is 
the setting of the monetary policy interest rate specifying interest rates for com-
mercial bank deposits and borrowing at the Danmarks Nationalbank. Today 
commercial banks are net depositors at Danmarks Nationalbank and the deposit 
rate is close to and sometimes even below zero. As Nationalbanken explains in 
the analysis, this is due to the fact that in response to the financial crisis, central 
banks around the world, including the ECB, have decreased interest rates to his-
torically low levels. Given the fixed exchange rate policy Danmarks Nationalbank 
has been forced to follow through and also lower its interest rates. Furthermore, 
major central banks have engaged in Asset Purchase Programs or Quantitative 
Easing. These programs amount to massive expansions of central bank balance 
sheets as central bank reserves are used to purchase bonds and other financial 
securities to prevent deflation. Globally the balance sheets of central banks have 
expanded by 15-20.000 bn dollars since the financial crisis. The ECB alone ac-
counts for approximately 3.000 bn dollars of this expansion. While Danmarks 
Nationalbank has not participated directly in Quantitative Easing programs, the 
                                         
 
 
20 Gürtler et al., ‘Central Bank Digital Currency in Denmark?’, 3. 
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effects of this expansive monetary policy has created an upward pressure on the 
krone to which Danmarks Nationalbank has had to respond by purchasing for-
eign currency. By committing itself to the fixed exchange rate against the euro, 
Danmarks Nationalbank is essentially just importing the monetary policy of the 
ECB. 
Standard monetary policy theories followed by central bankers suggest that a 
lowering of central bank interest rates are transmitted through various channels 
into the general economy, where it leads to inflation and eventually economic 
growth. While the practical monetary policy of the ECB and thus also by proxy 
Danmarks Nationalbank still seems to adhere to this idea, researchers at Dan-
marks Nationalbank have in fact on several occasions questioned and dismissed 
the theoretical underpinnings of several of its elements. The effects of the so-
called investment channel have been dismissed as it was impossible to observe a 
long term influence on investments from monetary policy.21 Similarly the effects 
of the so-called bank lending channel, whereby credit issued by private banks is 
influenced by the policy rate, have also been severely questioned.22 
This leaves only the so-called wealth channel as the only effective way for the 
current interest rate policy to influence the general economy. The idea is that 
lower interest rates increase the prices of assets such as stocks, bonds and real 
estate thus increasing the wealth of the owners of these assets, which then trans-
lates into increased consumption, inflation and growth. While empirical studies 
support the effects of this monetary policy transmission channel, they also high-
light how the mechanism produce 'collateral damage' in the form of rising ine-
quality, asset price inflation and increasing default risk default risk in pension 
savings. 
Observing the development of the world economy in general and the European 
economy in particular, where low levels of interest rates go hand in hand with 
low CPI inflation and an overhanging risk of deflation, the standard theory of 
monetary policy is indeed becoming more and more difficult to defend. Departing 
                                         
 
 
21 Danmarks Nationalbank, ‘Monetary Politics in Denmark’ (Danmarks Nationalbank, 
2009); Paul Lassenius Kramp and Jesper Pedersen, ‘Why Is Investment so Weak?’, 
Monetary Review (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2015). 
22 Anders Mølgaard Pedersen, ‘The Credit Channel in Monetary-Policy Analyses’, Mone-
tary Review (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2003), 97; Peter Askjær Drejer et al., ‘The Ef-
fects of Monetary Policy in Denmark’, Monetary Review (Danmarks Nationalbank, 
2011), 59. 
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FED chairman Janet Yellen has dubbed the situation a 'mystery.' Danmarks 
Nationalbank Governor Lars Rohde has said: 'We are now probably at a stage, 
were monetary policy has no large general effect any longer.'23 And a recent 
study has even demonstrated a positive correlation between interest rates and 
GDP growth in Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and USA.24 
The general diagnosis of the monetary policy situation in Europe and Den-
mark is relevant to the discussion of CBDC because it provides the benchmark 
against which we are evaluating the possible implications of implementing this 
new kind of money. It decides whether we are: (1) evaluating the possible extra 
features that CBDC might make to a monetary system, which is already func-
tioning almost perfectly, or whether we are: (2) evaluating how CBDC may help 
reform a monetary system that is inherently unstable and provide the central 
bank with new monetary policy tools in exchange for the old ones that seem to 
have become blunt. 
The general sentiment in Danmarks Nationalbanks analysis clearly points to 
the former notion and there is little hesitation in their rejection of CBDC on the 
grounds of monetary policy. We shall be looking into four arguments provided in 
the analysis: 
The first is that '[t]he interest rate on CBDC could not be used as a monetary 
policy instrument in Denmark' because of Danmarks Nationalbank's commitment 
to the fixed exchange rate.25 The argument along these lines is interesting be-
cause it admits how CBDC might be able to solve some of the problems with the 
inefficiency of existing transmission channels for central bank monetary policy 
discussed in the above:  
As the CBDC interest rate would affect households and businesses di-
rectly, it might be seen as a strong instrument to regulate the private 
sector’s demand, and thereby stabilise the economy. As a consequence 
of the fixed-exchange-rate policy, the level of Danmarks National-
bank’s interest rates is determined solely by what is compatible with 
                                         
 
 
23 Lone Andersen, ‘Lars Rohde: Centralbankernes bazookaer løber tør for ammunition’, 
Finans.dk, 2016 [our translation]. 
24 Kang-Soek Lee and Richard A. Werner, ‘Reconsidering Monetary Policy: An Empiri-
cal Examination of the Relationship Between Interest Rates and Nominal GDP 
Growth in the US, UK, Germany and Japan’, Ecological Economics 146 (2018): 26–
34. 
25 Gürtler et al., ‘Central Bank Digital Currency in Denmark?’, 18. 
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a stable krone exchange rate. This would also apply to the interest 
rate for CBDC. In a Danish context, interest on CBDC would there-
fore not present any new monetary-policy opportunities, since the in-
terest rate on CBDC would be set to keep the krone exchange rate 
fixed.26 
We see here, how the fixed exchange rate is elevated from being a means to 
stabilize the economy to being an end in itself. Even if CBDC would open a new 
and more direct transmission channel between central bank interest rates and 
growth and inflation rates in the general economy, this potential is dismissed 
with reference to the fixed exchange rate commitment. Therefore the matter of 
course, with which price stability by definition is made out to follow from the 
fixed exchange rate policy, is misleading. If forced to choose between the two, 
Danmarks Nationalbank remains committed to the latter. We see this illustrated 
in the current situation, where low interest rates are once again inflating prices in 
Danish housing markets beyond pre-crisis levels.  
This is, however, not a new situation brought about by an implementation of 
CBDC. As stated in the above quote, it already applies to the existing situation. 
We might argue that even if Danmarks Nationalbank currently did not wish to 
use CBDC interest rates as a proactive monetary policy tool due to the fixed 
exchange rate commitment, it might still be a useful option to have in hand in a 
future situation of crisis. When Draghi's QE 'bazooka' runs out of ammunition 
and the rest of Europa is caught up in a deflationary spiral, a Danish e-krone 
could be the Holger Danske sword that is picked up to save the country.  
The second argument is that '[t]he interest rate on CBDC would constitute a 
lower bound.' This is closely related to the discussion of bank runs in the previ-
ous section. In order to persuade money users to hold bank deposit money with 
credit risk instead of risk-free CBDC, Danmarks Nationalbank would have to 
keep interest rates on CBDC lower than the bank deposit rates. Since bank de-
posit rates today are already close to zero and in some instances even negative, 
Nationalbanken would probably also have to charge negative interest rates. Or 
the banks would have to raise their deposit interest rates. The implementation of 
CBDC, according to Danmarks Nationalbank, thus interferes with the mechanics 
of the market: 
                                         
 
 
26 Gürtler et al., 18. 
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Issuing CBDC could thus have consequences for interest rate for-
mation in the financial markets. The markets are characterised by 
how liquidity, risk and other conditions enter into the formation of 
prices, thereby contributing to the best possible allocation of capi-
tal.27 
The invocation of an ideological free-market argument to dismiss CBDC is 
paradoxical as the monetary policy of Nationalbanken is all about controlling 
interest rates, preventing credit risk to be factored into the pricing of bank mon-
ey, providing liquidity, and intervening in ForEx market to peg currency rates. 
Current money markets are hardly 'free' as it is and it is thus not clear whether 
the introduction of CBDC would make them more or less subject to state inter-
ference. 
The third monetary policy argument against CBDC is that it 'could intensify 
international capital movements.' In this argument, Danmarks Nationalbank 
shifts to a scenario, where it issues non-interest bearing CBDC. This would be a 
true digital version of cash, which is also by definition interest free. The problem 
here is a variety of what is discussed in the above. If foreign investors can hold 
risk-free, zero-interest CBDC, while relying on Danmarks Nationalbank to main-
tain a fixed exchange rate, they are provided with an arbitrage opportunity, if 
interest rates in the euro-zone move below zero. This would increase demand for 
the krone and create upward pressure on the exchange rate. If the euro-zone in-
terest rate were to move away from negative interest rates, this would create a 
reverse movement: 
CBDC could thus, in the longer term, lead to greater capital move-
ments both into and away from kroner, in step with changes in the 
relevant interest rate spreads. This could make it necessary to have a 
larger foreign-exchange reserve than today, to ensure an adequate 
buffer if households and businesses sell kroner.28 
While this argument makes sense, it is also worth noting that Danmarks Na-
tionalbank has already increased its foreign exchange reserves by kr. 300 bn. 
since the financial crisis and in 2015 momentarily by another kr. 200 bn. thereby 
exposing itself to exchange rate risk. CBDC is thus hardly creating a monetary 
policy problem that does not already exist. In light of the previous references to 
                                         
 
 
27 Gürtler et al., 19. 
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'the market', 'price formation' and 'allocation of capital', it is worth speculating 
whether the introduction of a risk-free, zero-interest CBDC constitutes a dis-
torting state intervention in an otherwise free market, or whether it is actually a 
sound form of money in limited supply that would provide a stable anchor point 
facilitating the free formation of prices on assets as well as on other forms of 
money. 
The final monetary policy argument against CBDC is concerned with the 
problem of 'higher seigniorage'. Seigniorage is the profits derived from the crea-
tion and issuance of money. Seigniorage profits in excess of the operational costs 
of Danmarks Nationalbank are transferred to the state. Today Danmarks Na-
tionalbank earns seigniorage on the issuance of cash and central bank reserves. In 
so far as CBDC increases the aggregate demand from central bank money it 
would lead to increasing seigniorage profits. 
In our current times of austerity, where most public institutions are required 
to cut their spending, it is curious to see how Danmarks Nationalbank is worried 
about earning too much money and thus perceives higher seigniorage as a prob-
lem. But as they state 'it is not Danmarks Nationalbank's objective to achieve 
the highest possible profit.' It is of course true that Danmarks Nationalbank 
should not just make new money to earn more money. At the same time, the fact 
that Danmarks Nationalbank abstains from creating digital money that can be 
held and used by ordinary money users means that seignorage profits on the cre-
ation of this kind of money is left to be appropriated by the commercial banking 
sector, whose 'objective' is exactly 'to achieve the highest possible profit.' A con-
servative estimate of the value of the privilege to create our electronic money, 
which allows the commercial banking sector to appropriate seigniorage, is an av-
erage of kr. 11.7 bn per year over the period 1991-2015.29 When we take it for 
granted that Danmarks Nationalbank and thus by proxy the state appropriates 
seigniorage on the issuance of physical cash, why do we not extend this logic to 
apply to electronic money as well? The implementation of CBDC would allow 
Danmarks Nationalbank and the state to reclaim at least some of these seignior-
age profits. 
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Central Bank Independence and Democracy 
Independence if often hailed as a virtue of central banks. The idea is that if kings 
or governments are allowed to interfere with the conduct of monetary policy, 
they are likely to abuse this power for political gains by pressuring the central 
bank to print more money or provide other forms of short-term stimulus to the 
economy. Independence protects the central bank from this kind of influence and 
thus allows it to retain a focus on long term financial and monetary stability. 
The question of CBDC is essentially a question about who should have the 
right and opportunity to create the money of a sovereign realm. Therefore the 
analysis of CBDC also provides an insight into the way that Danmarks National-
bank perceives its role in society at large and understands its mandate as an in-
dependent institution. Towards the end of the analysis, we find the following 
concern: 
Issuing CBDC would increase the direct contact between Danmarks 
Nationalbank and households and businesses. This would increase the 
risk of dissatisfied customers for Danmarks Nationalbank. This might 
be due to system failure, or if the facilities offered in relation to 
CBDC – for example the user interface which enables households and 
businesses to access their CBDC – were not considered to be suffi-
ciently user-friendly. The extent to which this type of criticism of 
Danmarks Nationalbank would influence Danmarks Nationalbank’s 
credibility with regard to the task of ensuring financial stability and 
stable prices is an open question. 
Depending on how a CBDC is designed, this could also exert political 
pressure on Danmarks Nationalbank. In the event of financial unrest, 
there might be pressure from politicians or the media for the CBDC 
ceiling to be raised, even if the ceiling were to be fixed beforehand.30  
If we think of money users as potentially obnoxious customers, politicians as 
irresponsible tyrants, and the media as a catalyst for collective hysteria, the con-
cern of Danmarks Nationalbank makes sense. If, however, we think of money 
users as citizens, whom Nationalbanken has an obligation to serve in the best 
possible manner, if we think of politicians as the elected representatives of the 
democratic society, and if we think of the media as the domain of public debate 
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and critique, the statement leaves the impression of an institution that does not 
seem to think that it has to answer to anyone. 
Which other public institution could afford to express such lack of respect for 
the citizens as well as the democratic system that it is obliged to serve? Imagine 
the Danish State Railways, DSB, refusing to engage with customers in order to 
avoid possible criticism. Imagine the Danish public schools being screened from 
any interference from democratically elected politicians. Or imagine the police 
not having to consider critique raised in the media. Of course politicians, journal-
ists or private individuals should not be able to interfere with the day-to-day 
operations of Danmarks Nationalbank. But using this as argument for not im-
plementing a system, which could be beneficial for money users and could turn 
out to be an efficient monetary policy tool in the event of a future crisis, seems to 
be throwing out the baby with the bathing water. 
It is interesting to contrast this self-perception and the implied idea of inde-
pendence with the approach of two other Nordic central banks. Not only are both 
Svenska Riksbanken and Norges Bank much more exploratory and much less 
conclusive in their study of CBDC, they also do not want the decision on this 
important matter to be made in a closed technocratic forum. Here is how the 
Governor of Riksbanken accompanies his preliminary thoughts on the e-krona 
with an invitation to debate: 
These are our initial thoughts and the reason why we published the 
report before we have thought it all through is that we want to have 
a dialogue with the market and other interested parties, as it is such 
a complex issue. The dialogues have now been initiated.31 
Deputy Governor of Norges Bank, Jon Nicolaisen, displays a similar amount 
of humility and respect for democracy in his speech on CBDC: 
Choosing the direction our future monetary system and payment sys-
tem will take requires not only economists, but also technologists, 
lawyers and other social scientists. And political decisions will ulti-
mately need to be made by our elected representatives. It devolves 
upon the Storting to supervise the monetary system of the realm. The 
questions are numerous, but we already have one of the answers. 
Central banks were established to build confidence in the monetary 
system. That is still our primary task. We cannot leave the monetary 
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system entirely in the hands of private entities. There will be a role 
for central bank money. We must have a legislative framework and a 
means of payment backed by the authorities to ensure trust in our 
money – as history has shown. 32   
For comparison this is how Danmarks Nationalbank concludes their analysis: 
Danmarks Nationalbank assesses that the central bank must continue 
to be the banker to the banks, rather than the bank for all of Den-
mark’s population.33 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have reviewed the arguments against the implementation of 
CBDC in Denmark put forward in the recent analysis by Danmarks National-
bank. The analysis by Danmarks Nationalbank is interesting for two reasons. 
First of all, it is the most conclusive dismissal of CBDC put forward by any cen-
tral bank so far. In this sense, it provides a very honest expression of the way 
that the most critical and conservative central bankers view CBDC. The boldness 
of the analysis makes it a fruitful object for intellectual engagement. And second, 
the question of CBDC inevitably opens up a set of more fundamental questions 
about the role and responsibility of central banks in society as well as the nature 
and purpose of money itself. While the analysis by Danmarks Nationalbank does 
not address these questions explicitly, their thinking about CBDC implicitly pro-
vides a rare insight into the self-perception of Danmarks Nationalbank and its 
purpose and loyalties in Danish society. 
As we have seen, there are three elements in the dismissal of CBDC corre-
sponding to the three mandates of Danmarks Nationalbank: payment system 
provision, financial stability and monetary policy. With respect to payment sys-
tem provision, CBDC is dismissed on the grounds that it does not add efficiency 
or further functionality to existing payment solutions. From a narrow user per-
spective, this argument seems perfectly reasonable. It does, however, fail to rec-
ognize that money users are not only interested in whether they can use their 
mobile phone to pay for groceries or use online banking to pay their bills in the 
middle of the night. Money users may also be concerned with risks building up in 
the banking sector and thus have a legitimate need for a risk-free place to store 
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digital money, even if credit-risk on bank money currently seems to be merely 
theoretical. 
When Danmarks Nationalbank then proceeds to discuss CBDC in the context 
of financial stability, the money users' need for the opportunity to store risk-free 
digital money is not only neglected. It is even invoked as an argument against 
CBDC as it constitutes a risk of a digital bank run. The implementation of 
CBDC would put market pressure on banks to manage their business in a way 
that does not expose customers' money to more risk than justified by the inter-
ests paid on deposits, since money users would have a risk-free alternative. The 
approach of Danmarks Nationalbank is, however, to force money users to use 
bank deposit money by not providing a risk-free alternative. This solution also 
forces money users to absorb the risks of the banking sector either as depositors 
or ultimately as tax payers. 
On the grounds of monetary policy, the idea of CBDC is dismissed by the ar-
gument that it would interfere with the fixed exchange rate policy of the krone 
against the euro. It is, however, difficult to see how the implementation of CBDC 
creates new problems that do not already exist. The policy rate of Danmarks 
Nationalbank is already dictated by the interest rate of the ECB, which forces 
Denmark to import the monetary policy of the Eurozone. And Danmarks Na-
tionalbank has already been forced to expand its reserves of foreign currency to 
counter the upward pressure on the krone due to quantitative easing and other 
inflationary policies of the ECB. 
Furthermore, Danmarks Nationalbank fails to consider the opportunities in 
having a CBDC infrastructure in place, which would provide a wider arsenal of 
monetary policy tools in a future situation of crisis. Even if it is currently not 
feasible to use proactive interest rate adjustments or sheer money creation (heli-
copter money) to stimulate the economy, they might turn out to be valuable 
options in case something unexpected happens. Just like an army cannot afford 
to organize on the assumption that a current state of peace will continue eternal-
ly into the future, so must a central bank also design the monetary system to be 
resilient even in the event of the unexpected. A preemptive implementation of 
CBDC might constitute a display of due diligence ('rettidig omhu') by National-
banken. 
Although some of the concerns of Danmarks Nationalbank with regards to the 
possible implementation of CBDC are perfectly reasonable and sensible, the gen-
eral line of the argument may be summed up through the notion of 'kettle logic'. 
This notion is derived from Freud, who tells the story of a man accused by his 
neighbor of having returned a borrowed kettle in a broken condition. The man 
 24 
refuses the accusation by making three arguments: (1) He had returned the kettle 
intact. (2) The kettle was already broken when he borrowed it. And (3) he had 
never borrowed the kettle in the first place. The peculiar 'kettle logic' is of course 
constituted by the fact that each of the individual arguments undermines the 
premises of the other two. 
The kettle logic of Danmarks Nationalbank's dismissal of CBDC becomes visi-
ble if we boil it down to three claims: (1) CBDC does not contribute anything to 
the payment system that is not already provided by existing commercial bank 
deposit money so its implementation would provide no additional benefits for 
money users. (2) If money users are provided with the opportunity to hold risk-
free money at the central bank they will use it to avoid the inherent risk in the 
commercial banking sector thus causing a digital bank run as they convert their 
bank deposit money into CBDC. And (3) Danmarks Nationalbank is the banker 
to the banks rather than the bank for all of Denmark’s population, so even if 
CBDC did benefit the general money user, it would not be implemented anyway 
as long as it posed a threat to the existing business model of the banks. 
As this review has shown, Danmarks Nationalbank appears rather adamant in 
their dismissal of CBDC. But in the very last paragraph of their analysis a win-
dow of opportunity is opened, albeit ajar: 
If another central bank were to decide to introduce a CBDC, this 
would be of significance to Danmarks Nationalbank and the financial 
system. This makes it important to monitor developments.34 
Behind the skepticism in Danmarks Nationalbank's approach to CBDC is 
probably a genuine desire to create stability by making sure that things stay 
more or less as they are. The paradox of stability is, however, that sometimes the 
best way to make sure that some things stay the same is to change other things. 
Two leading scholars in the debate on CBDC warn: 
Central banks have generally been renowned as conservative institu-
tions - staid, cautions, and inertial. /.../ [A] passive and inertial ap-
proach towards CBDC may not be the most prudent strategy. Ra-
ther, many central banks are now moving expeditiously in considering 
CBDC and in investigating its logistical and technical details.35   
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As Danmarks Nationalbank proceeds to 'monitor developments' we can hope 
that they pay close attention to what is happening in Sweden. Even though 
Danmarks Nationalbank is probably not going to be the one making history this 
time, they could still find inspiration in the following quote by the Governor of 
Riksbanken: 
I would like to conclude my speech by reminding you that it was in 
Stockholm that the first modern banknote was created more than 350 
years ago, and that it is here, in Sweden, that cash is currently taking 
its last breaths. Perhaps the Riksbank will be writing history again.36 
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